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RETHINKING INRE BUSCH: BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE OF
SEXUAL HARASSMENT JUDGMENTS UNDER
SECTION 523(A)(6)
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and state and local
federal employment protection agencies received almost 14,000 complaints
regarding sexual harassment resulting in $50,000,000 in settlements and millions
more in judgments.' During the twelve-month period ending on March 31, 2004,
over 1,600,000 people filed for bankruptcy.2 The goal of sexual harassment laws
is to protect employees by compensating them for their losses and to deter
employers from future violations.3 On the other hand, the Bankruptcy Code focuses
on providing the debtor with a "fresh start" and ensuring equality of distribution
among creditors.4 While the underlying policies of bankruptcy and protection
against sexual harassment are laudable, considerable tension arises when the victim
of sexual harassment becomes the creditor of the harasser's estate.
In In re Busch, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
New York discharged a sexual harassment verdict for $400,000 in compensatory
and punitive damages against the debtor.5 The Bankruptcy Code states that a debt
"for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property
of another entity" is nondischargeable.6 In construing this provision of the
Bankruptcy Code,7 the Busch court looked to the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Kawaauhau v. Geiger.8 Geiger held that the willful prong requires that
the debtor must intend to cause injury, not simply intend to perform the act.9 The
Busch court held that the actions underlying the sexual harassment verdict were not
willful and therefore, the debt was dischargeable."
This Note argues that the Busch decision incorrectly applied the Geiger
standard to find the debtor's actions were not willful. Further, the Bankruptcy
Court for the District of South Carolina should reject the Busch court's rationale
and hold that the majority of sexual harassment verdicts are nondischargeable. Part
II discusses Geiger and its standard for willfulness. Part III examines the
dischargeability of sexual harassment verdicts prior to Geiger while Part IV
analyzes how courts have applied the Geiger standard to sexual harassment verdicts.
Finally, Part V provides an in-depth discussion of Busch and analyzes how the court
1. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Sexual Harassment Charges, EEOC &
FEPAs Combined: FY 1992 - FY 2003, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html (last modified Mar.
8, 2004).
2. Table F-2, U.S. Bankruptcy Courts, Business andNonbusiness Bankruptcy Cases Commenced,
By Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the 12-Month Period Ending March 31, 2004,
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, at http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/f2table.xls (last
visited Feb. 21, 2005).
3. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980).
4. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 563 (1994).
5. Sanger v. Busch (In re Busch), 311 B.R. 657 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2004).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2004) (emphasis added).
7. In re Busch, 311 B.R. at 664.
8. 523 U.S. 57 (1998).
9. In re Geiger, 523 U.S. at 61.
10. In re Busch, 311 B.R. at 671. For provisions in the Bankruptcy Code mandating discharge,
see 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2004) (Chapter 7 Bankruptcy); 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (Chapter 11 Bankruptcy); 11
U.S.C. § 1228 (Chapter 12 Bankruptcy); and 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (Chapter 13 Bankruptcy).
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incorrectly discharged the plaintiffs sexual harassment verdict pursuant to §
523(a)(6).1
II. KAWAAUHAU V. GEIGER: THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF THE
WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS EXCEPTION TO DISCHARGE
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Kawaauhau v. Geiger,
the majority of United States Bankruptcy Courts held that sexual harassment
verdicts were nondischargeable debts pursuant to § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy
Code.12 However, some federal district courts and courts of appeals split on the
issue.'3 The Supreme Court's decision in Geiger resolved the disparity between the
courts and fundamentally altered their analysis by announcing a single test for
determining whether a debt is nondischargeable pursuant to the "willful and
malicious" exception to discharge in § 523(a)(6).
In Geiger, the plaintiff was under the treatment of the defendant-physician for
a foot injury.'4 The defendant placed the plaintiff in the hospital and prescribed oral
penicillin to guard against infection.'5 Defendant admitted at trial that prescribing
intravenous penicillin would have been a more effective treatment. The defendant
cited the plaintiff's desire to keep the costs of care low as his reason for prescribing
oral penicillin instead. 6 Because the defendant left for a business trip, other
physicians assumed care of the plaintiff.1" These physicians intended to transfer the
plaintiff to an infectious disease specialist, but upon return, the defendant believed
the infection was cured and thus cancelled the transfer and ceased all treatment."
The infection persisted, however, and worsened to the point of requiring amputation
of the plaintiff's leg. 9
The plaintiff and her husband sued the defendant for malpractice. The jury
awarded the plaintiff $335,000 in special and general damages and awarded her
husband approximately $50,000 in damages for loss of consortium and emotional
11. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). Chapter 11 of the United States Code codifies the Bankruptcy Code.
Hereinafter, this Note will refer to sections of the Bankruptcy Code by section number only.
12. See Gee v. Hammond (In re Gee), 173 B.R. 189 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994); Biggers v. Wilson
(In re Wilson), 216 B.R. 258 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1997); Liccio v. Topakas (In re Topakas), 202 B.R.
850 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996), aft'd, No. 96-8617, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4107 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31,
1997); Avery v. Sotelo (In re Sotelo), 179 B.R, 214 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1995); Johnson v. Miera (In re
Miera), 104 B.R. 150 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989), aff'd, 926 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1991). Cf Heflin v.
Harris (In re Harris), No. 94-C-7496, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11377 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 1995)
(discharging sexual harassment judgment where plaintiff did not prove by the preponderance of the
evidence that the debtor's actions were willful and malicious). For a further discussion of these cases,
see infra Part Il.
13. Joanne Gelfand, The Treatment of Employment Discrimination Claims in Bankruptcy:
Priority Status, Stay Relief Dischargeability, and Exemptions, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 601, 629.
Compare Johnson v. Miera (In re Miera), 926 F.2d 741(8th Cir. 1991) (affirming bankruptcy court's
decision refusing to discharge sexual harassment judgment where debtor committed sexual battery by
kissing Plaintiff), and Liccio v. Topakas (In re Topakas), No. 96-8617, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4107
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1997) (affirming bankruptcy court's decision refusing to discharge sexual
harassment judgment where debtor subjected plaintiff to unwanted and offensive physical contact that
constituted sexual harassment), with Heflin v. Harris (In re Harris), No. 94-C-7496, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11377 (N.D. 111. Aug. 9, 1995) (discharging sexual harassmentjudgment where plaintiffdid not
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the debtor's actions were willful and malicious).
14. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 59 (1998).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
[Vol. 56: 645
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distress.20 Lacking malpractice insurance, the defendant petitioned for bankruptcy.
The plaintiff requested the bankruptcy court to declare the verdicts against the
defendant nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code,
because the defendant's actions were willful and malicious.
2'
The bankruptcy court held that the defendant's treatment was far below the
standard of care. 2 In its decision, the bankruptcy court discussed the disagreement
among jurisdictions as to whether the willful prong of§ 523(a)(6) requires an intent
to act or an intent to injure.23 The court discussed several different interpretations
of the willful prong and determined that the defendant's conduct was willful,
because it constituted a conscious disregard of his duties and necessarily resulted
in injury.
24
On defendant's appeal, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court's decision.25 Upon rehearing en banc,
a divided court of appeals again reversed the bankruptcy court and held that a
debtor's actions cannot meet the willful prong of § 523(a)(6) unless the debtor
"'desires to cause consequences of his act, or... believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it .... ""' Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States.
The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision reversing the
bankruptcy court and discharging the debt.27 The Court held that "[t]he word
'willful' in (a)(6) modifies the word 'injury,' indicating that nondischargeability
takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that
leads to injury., 28 Following the practice of strictly construing exceptions to
discharge, the Court reasoned that Congress would have "described instead 'willful
acts that cause injury"' if the intent was to except from discharge debts resulting
from the debtor's intentional acts rather than the debtor's intentional torts.29 Thus,
the Court held that reckless or negligent acts could not satisfy the willful prong of
the "willful and malicious" exception to discharge. 0
Ill. PRE-GEIGER TREATMENT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT: CONSISTENT
NONDISCHARGE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT VERDICTS
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Geiger, the overwhelming majority of
bankruptcy courts held that injuries caused by a debtor's sexual harassment were
"willful and malicious" under § 523(a)(6).3 These pre-Geiger cases are important,
because many bankruptcy courts continue to look to them in deciding that sexual
20. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 59 (1998).
21. Id. at 60.
22. Kawaauhau v. Geiger (In re Geiger), 172 B.R. 916,923 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994).
23. Id. at 920.
24. Id. at 920-24.
25. Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger), 93 F.3d 443 (8th Cir. 1996).
26. Geiger v. Kawaauhau (In re Geiger), 113 F.3d 848,852 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965)) (alteration in original).
27. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 64 (1998).
28. Id. at 61.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
30. Id.
31. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
2005]
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harassment verdicts are nondischargeable debts.32 Further, these cases illustrate a
strong judicial history of categorizing sexual harassment as the type of intentional
conduct the damages for which Congress sought to withhold from discharge under
§ 523(a)(6). 33
In re Gee was the first case to hold a state court judgment for sexual
harassment nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).34 In Gee, the trial court held that
the defendant-debtor sexually harassed the plaintiff where he made unwelcome and
unsolicited advances toward her that altered the terms of her employment. 35 The
court awarded the plaintiff $650 in damages and $13,000 in attorney's fees.36 The
defendant filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 7 The plaintiff petitioned the bankruptcy
court to declare the sexual harassment judgment nondischargeable pursuant to §
523(a)(6). as The bankruptcy court gave preclusive effect to the state court judgment
under the doctrine of collateral estoppel and held that the judgment was
nondischargeable.39 The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed.'
In its decision, the bankruptcy appellate panel stated that the "willful and
malicious" standard for nondischargeability in § 523(a)(6) requires the plaintiff to
establish that the defendant "had actual knowledge or the reasonable foreseeability
that his conduct might result in injury to the creditor. 4' The bankruptcy appellate
panel held that, "[s]ince the bankruptcy court found that it was foreseeable that
Gee's advances would injure [the plaintiff], it did not have to consider Gee's
subjective state of mind.
42
32. See, e.g., Jones v. Svreck (In re Jones), 300 B.R. 133, 141 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2003) (noting that
the appellate court's decision not to discharge a sexual harassment judgment was consistent with
Biggers v. Wilson (In re Wilson), 216 B.R. 258 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1997), a pre-Geiger case); Ludwig
v. Martino (In re Martino), 220 B.R. 129, 132-33 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998) (citing Gee v. Hammond
(In re Gee), 173 B.R. 189, 192-93 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994)) (finding that "a sexual harassment claim
is excepted from discharge when it constitutes an obligation stemming from a willful and malicious
injury").
33. 173 B.R. 189 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994).
34. In Johnson v. Miera (In re Miera), 104 B.R. 150 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989), aff'd, 926 F.2d 741
(8th Cir. 1991), the court held that a state court judgment based on sexual harassment and sexual
battery was nondischargeable. However, in that case, the plaintiff based his petition to except the debt
from discharge on the sexual battery being a willful and malicious act. The plaintiff-court reporter,
Neil Johnson, brought sexual harassment and battery claims against the defendant-debtor Alberto
Miera, a Minnesota state district court judge. The trial court found that the judge had kissed his court
reporter on the lips without consent and "had made other unsolicited and unwanted sexual overtures
to him." Id. at 153. The trial court awarded the court reporter judgments for sexual harassment and
battery, but the plaintiff only petitioned to exclude the battery judgment. Id. at 153 n.2.
35. Hammond v. Gee (In re Gee), 156 B.R. 291, 292 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1993).
36. In re Gee, 173 B.R. at 191. The bankruptcy appellate panel later held that the award of
attorney's fees was improper. Id. at 193-94. Overturning the award of attorney's fees, however, does
not affect the § 523(a)(6) analysis.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. In re Gee, 156 B.R. at 294.
40. Hammond v. Gee (In re Gee), 173 B.R. 189, 194 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994).
41. Id. at 192 (citation omitted). The court used this language to describe the malicious prong
of § 523(a)(6), while stating that the willful prong requires that the act be "deliberate or intentional."
Id. However, a comparison between the Gee court's analysis of the malicious prong and the Supreme
Court's analysis of the willful prong in Geiger is useful, because both courts required specific intent
on the part of the debtor in order for the debt to be nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6). For a
case applying the Gee court's interpretation of § 523(a)(6) to except a sexual harassment judgment
from discharge, see Avery v. Sotelo (In re Sotelo), 179 B.R. 214 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1995).
42. In re Gee, 173 B.R. at 194.
[Vol. 56: 645
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In re Topakas43 also held that a claim for sexual harassment was
nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6). In Topakas, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant "rubbed his groin area against her buttocks," "grabbed her between the
legs near her crotch," made lewd and sexually suggestive comments towards her,
and created a sexually abusive work environment. 4 After the plaintiff filed her
sexual harassment suit, but before trial, the defendant filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy
and listed the plaintiff as an unsecured creditor.4 5 Thus, unlike Gee, no underlying
state court judgment collaterally estopped the defendant from litigating the sexual
harassment claim in the bankruptcy court. Therefore, the bankruptcy court heard
testimony and reviewed the underlying facts of the sexual harassment case. The
court held, without liquidating the plaintiff's damages, that the plaintiff's claims
were nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6).
46
Like the court in Gee, the Topakas court required the plaintiff to prove that the
debtor acted with the intent to injure or with substantial certainty that injury would
result from his actions for the resulting debt to be nondischargeable 7 The
defendant claimed that he did not intend any harm, but the court refused to accept
that "grabbing a woman's crotch and touching her breast [without
consent] ... would ever be deemed appropriate ... and unlikely to produce any
injury." Furthermore, the court stated that "[t]he Debtor cannot credibly claim
ignorance of violations of the claimants' rights . . . nor ignorance of the
repercussions of his actions .... ." The court held that the defendant "willfully and
maliciously" caused the plaintiffphysical and emotional injuries, and therefore, that
the sexual harassment claim was nondischargeable.5"
Finally, the court in In re Wilson51 held a sexual harassment judgment
nondischargeable where a state agency, whose decision a circuit court and court of
appeals subsequently affi-med, held that the defendant-debtor sexually harassed the
plaintiff.52 In Wilson, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant held her down and
reached underneath her dress and pantyhose, solicited her for sex on numerous
occasions, and terminated her because she refused to sleep with him.5 3 A state
agency found that the defendant sexually harassed the plaintiff and awarded the
plaintiff damages for lost future wages and attorney's fees.' Defendant
subsequently filed for bankruptcy, and the plaintiff petitioned the bankruptcy court
to declare the judgment nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6).
5
The Wilson court applied a less strict standard for "willful and malicious" under
§ 523(a)(6) than the courts in Gee and Topakas. The court held that "[a] 'willful'
act is one that is deliberate and intentional, and a 'malicious' act is one that is
wrongful and taken without just cause or excuse, even though without ill will.
5 6
43. Liccio v. Topakas (In re Topakas), 202 B.R. 850 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, No. 96-8617,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4107 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 1997).
44. Id. at 853-54.
45. Id. at 852-53.
46. Id. at 859.
47. Id. at 860. See also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
48. Id. at 861.
49. Liccio v. Topakas (In re Topakas), 202 B.R. 850, 861 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, No. 96-
8617, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4107 (E.D. Pa. Mr. 31, 1999).
50. Id. at 862.
51. 216 B.R. 258 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1997).
52. Id. at 269.
53. Id. at 261-63.
54. Id. at 263.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 267 (citations omitted).
2005]
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The Wilson court applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to give preclusive effect
to the underlying decision and found that the defendant's actions were deliberate,
as they clearly led to the plaintiff's injuries." In addition, the court found that the
defendant's actions were malicious in that the plaintiffs wrongful termination was
without justification. 
5
Gee, Topakas, and Wilson demonstrate that pre-Geiger courts considered sexual
harassment the type of conduct that Congress meant to discourage through §
523(a)(6). Furthermore, Gee and Topakas applied a standard that required the
debtor to have a specific intent to injure to establish "willful and malicious injury"
under § 523(a)(6), which is identical to the Geiger standard. 9 The pre-Geiger
courts clearly were able to harmonize the goal of narrowly construing exceptions
to discharge with the goal of effectively compensating the victims of sexual
harassment.
IV. POST-GEIGER TREATMENT OF SExuAL HARASSMENT: NEW STANDARD, SAME
RESULT
Geiger eliminated the "deliberate and intentional" test for willful conduct under
§ 523(a)(6) that many courts used prior to Geiger and supplanted it with the
requirement that the debtor specifically intend to injure the plaintiff.6" However,
even under this strict standard, the majority of bankruptcy courts have still held
sexual harassment judgments nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6).6" These
courts have continued to recognize that sexual harassment is the type of conduct
Congress intended to except from discharge under § 523(a)(6).
In In re Jones,62 the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the First Circuit affirmed
the bankruptcy court's decision excepting the plaintiff's sexual harassment
judgment from discharge pursuant to § 523(a)(6).6  The appellate panel held that
the defendant-debtor's actions in making "'frequent, substantial sexual comments
about [the plaintiff], concerning her dress and breasts, as well as inappropriate
staring, rubbing and touching' constituted "willful and malicious" conduct under
the Geiger test.94 The court found that the defendant's refusal to comply with the
plaintiff's requests to stop harassing her, along with the defendant's interference
with the plaintiff's ability to work, evidenced an intent to injure.
65
57. Biggers v. Wilson (In re Wilson), 216 B.R. 258, 268 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1997).
58. Id.
59. See Gelfand, supra note 13, at 632-33.
60. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998).
61. See Jones v. Svreck (In re Jones), 300 B.R. 133 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2003); McDonough v. Smith
(In re Smith), 270 B.R. 544 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001); Merriex v. Beale (In re Beale), 253 B.R. 644
(Bankr. D. Md. 2000); Thompson v. Kelly (In re Kelly), 238 B.R. 156 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1999);
Ludwig v. Martino (In re Martino), 220 B.R. 129 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998). Cf Voss v. Tompkins (In
re Tompkins), 290 B.R. 194 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding a sexual harassment judgment
dischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6)).
62. Jones v. Svreck (In re Jones), 300 B.R. 133 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2003).
63. Id. at 140. The bankruptcy court applied collateral estoppel to give preclusive effect to a state
agency's decision finding that defendant sexually harassed the plaintiff. The bankruptcy court held that
the state agency's findings were sufficient to prove that defendant's actions were "willful and
malicious" under § 523(a)(6). Id. at 137.
64. Id. at 139, 141.
65. Id. at 140.
[Vol. 56: 645
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The Jones court relied on In re Smith" in holding that the defendant's conduct
was "willful."'67 In Smith, the plaintiff recovered state court judgments against the
defendant for quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment."" The
court found that the defendant's actions were willful under the Geiger test, because
he "knew the consequences of his actions"'69 and "knew exactly what he was doing
and what he wanted to accomplish."7° That is, the court found that the defendant's
conduct in conditioning the plaintiff s employment on sex was intentional and that
he clearly contemplated the consequences of the plaintiff losing her job and
suffering other injuries.
In re Martino" is another case in which the bankruptcy court applied the
Geiger test and held a sexual harassment judgment nondischargeable pursuant to
§ 523(a)(6).72 InMartino, the trial court found that the debtor directed abusive and
obscene language toward the plaintiff, showed sexually explicit films during
working hours, hired a stripper to perform at work during working hours, and
directed other inappropriate sexual conduct toward the plaintiff.73 As a result, the
plaintiff suffered emotional and physical injuries including loss of sleep, hair loss,
and the onset of shingles. 4 The trial court held the defendant guilty of sexual
harassment and awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages and $50,000 in
punitive damages.75 The defendant subsequently filed for bankruptcy, and the
plaintiff petitioned the bankruptcy court to declare the judgment nondischargeable
pursuant to § 523(a)(6).
76
The bankruptcy court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and
held that the trial court's decision precluded the defendant from relitigating the issue
of whether or not his actions were "willful and malicious."77 The court found that,
because the "[d]efendant 'acted with a willful indifference to the rights of the
plaintiff with respect to the plaintiff's claim of sexual harassment,"' and injury
necessarily resulted, his actions evidenced a specific intent to injure. 71 Furthermore,
the court held that the trial court's award of punitive damages evidenced that the
defendant's actions were "willful and malicious" and thus precluded the discharge
66. McDonough v. Smith (In re Smith), 270 B.R. 544 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2001).
67. Jones v. Svreck (In re Jones), 300 B.R. 133, 140 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2003).
68. In re Smith, 270 B.R. at 546-47. An employer is guilty of quid pro quo sexual harassment
when the employer conditions employment or benefits on submission to sexual conduct. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11 (a) (2004). An employer is guilty of hostile work environment sexual harassment when the
employer's conduct has "the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." Id. For a further
discussion of the requirements for quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment, see
Marie T. Reilly, A Paradigm for Sexual Harassment: Toward the Optimal Level of Loss, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 427, 452, 457 (1994).
69. In re Jones, 300 B.R. at 140.
70. Id. (quoting In re Smith, 270 B.R. at 550).
71. Ludwig v. Martino (In re Martino), 220 B.R. 129 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998).
72. Id. at 133. The Eleventh Circuit applied the same standard for "willful and malicious" that
the Geiger decision later set forth. Id. at 132 (citing Hope v. Walker (In re Walker), 48 F.3d 1161
(11th Cir. 1995)).
73. Id. at 130.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 130-31.
76. Ludwig v. Martino (In re Martino), 220 B.R. 129, 130 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998).
77. Id. at 132 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1998) (citing In re Gee, 173 B.R. 189, 192-93 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1994).
78. Id. at 133.
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of the underlying debt.79 Therefore, the sexual harassment judgment against the
defendant was nondischargeable pursuant to § 523(a)(6).80
Finally, the bankruptcy court in In re Beale8' held that a sexual harassment
judgment, where the trial court awarded punitive damages, was nondischargeable
under § 523(a)(6).82 In Beale, the court precluded the defendant from relitigating
the issue of whether or not his actions were "willful and malicious" where the trial
court's decision supported a finding of willful and malicious conduct.8a The court
held that, where the jury was required to find "'by clear and convincing evidence,
that [the act or acts of the defendants] . .. were conducted willfully, with evil
motive and actual malice'" in awarding punitive damages, the award of punitive
damages satisfied the "willful and malicious injury" standard under § 523(a)(6).84
The above cited cases demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of post-
Geiger courts consider sexual harassment willful and malicious conduct. However,
one court discharged a sexual harassment claim pursuant to § 523(a)(6) where the
plaintiff failed toProve that the defendant acted willfully under the Geiger test. In
In re Tompkins,' the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
New York refused to preclude the defendant from relitigating whether or not his
conduct was willful and malicious under § 523(a(6) where the plaintiff and
defendant had entered into a settlement agreement.8 Thus, the bankruptcy court
reviewed the record from the underlying sexual harassment claim and held that the
defendant did not possess the intent to injure the plaintiff that the Geiger test
required.87
In Tompkins, the plaintiff worked for the defendant at a jewelry store. The
plaintiff testified that, during her employment, the defendant would, among other
things, "grab her hips or arms in a sexual caressing manner when walking
behind... the jewelry counter[,] compliment her ... [,] make comments about his
ex-girlfriend's breasts[,] ... [and] make other comments that she did not believe
were appropriate for the workplace." 8 The plaintiff testified she made clear to the
defendant that his actions were unwelcome, and that the defendant's conduct forced
her to quit her job and subsequently caused her to suffer from depression.89 The
defendant denied directing any sexual conduct toward the plaintiff.9 The defendant
also denied ever signing the settlement agreement.9' However, when the defendant
filed for bankruptcy, he listed the plaintiff as an unsecured creditor.92
The court held that the defendant's actions did not rise to sexual harassment.
The court held that the defendant's actions did not constitute quid pro quo sexual
harassment, because the plaintiff "never testified that there had been a sexual
assault, a request for sexual favors, or a threat made and carried out when sexual
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Merriex v. Beale (In re Beale), 253 B.R. 644 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000).
82. Id. at 650.
83. See id.
84. Id.
85. Voss v. Tompkins (In re Tompkins), 290 B.R. 194 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2003).
86. Id. at 199.
87. Id. at 201.
88. Id. at 197.
89. Id. at 197-98.
90. Id. at 198.
91. Voss v. Tompkins (In re Tompkins), 290 B.R. 194, 198 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2003).
92. Id. at 196.
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favors or liberties were requested by the Debtor and subsequently denied by her."93
The court also held the defendant's actions did not constitute "hostile work
environment" sexual harassment, because the plaintiffs claims were exaggerated
and not credible, and even if the plaintiff's claims were true, the defendant's actions
were sufficiently isolated to find that they did not create a hostile work
environment. 4
The absence of sexual harassment did not automatically preclude the court from
finding the underlying judgment nondischargeable.9" The court noted that, "absent
[the] finding of sexual harassment ... that some Courts have found necessarily
makes the conduct and resulting damage fall within the discharge exception, [the
plaintiff] must demonstrate that the Debtor's conduct was willful and malicious as
required by the Geiger standard." The court held that the record did not support
such a finding and discharged the debt.97
V. INRE BUSCH: AN UNFORTUNATE APPLICATION OF GEIGER
A. Summary of the Case
In In re Busch,9" the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District
of New York held a sexual harassment judgment dischargeable pursuant to §
523(a)(6)." Despite a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff over $400,000 in
compensatory and punitive damages, the trial court refused to apply collateral
estoppel to preclude the defendant from litigating the issue of whether or not his
conduct was willful and malicious."° Instead, the court reviewed the record and
held that the plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
debtor's conduct was willful and malicious under the Geiger standard."'
In Busch, the plaintiff worked from 1996 to 1998 at a company that the
defendant owned and controlled."° In July 2001, the plaintiff filed suit against the
defendant-debtor for sexual harassment.' The defendant received service through
the plaintiffs complaint, but he neglected to answer, and, therefore, the court held
him in default on the issue of liability.' At an inquest to determine damages, the
plaintiff testified that the defendant had committed numerous acts of sexual
harassment:
including repeated attempts to kiss her...; attempting to put his
hands underneath her shirt; joking about getting an apartment
where they could "fool around"; unzipping his pants and exposing
his genitals;... exposing and touching his genitalia to her ann on
two occasions; and insinuating that he would give her petty cash
93. Id. at 200. For a discussion of the requirements for quid pro quo and hostile work
environment sexual harassment, see supra note 68.
94. Id. at 201.
95. Id.
96. Id. (emphasis added).
97. Voss v. Tompkins (In re Tompkins), 290 B.R. 194,201 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2003).
98. Sanger v. Busch (In re Busch), 311 B.R. 657 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2004).
99. Id. at 671.
100. Id. at 668.
101. Id. at 671.
102. Id. at 660.
103. Id.
104. Sanger v. Busch (In re Busch), 311 B.R. 657, 660 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2004).
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and provide an apartment for her if she accepted his sexual
advances.'
The plaintiff testified that, as a result of the defendant's conduct, she sought
counseling, quit her job, lost her unemployment benefits, lost her health insurance,"experienced difficulty finding other employment because she feared placement in
a similar work environment[,] and she was afraid to go outside her house at night
because she feared that the Debtor was 'going to try and kill [her].""16
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the judge explained to the jury that it
could award punitive damages if the plaintiff proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that "the defendants' conduct was malicious or [sic] reckless disregard of
the plaintiff's rights."'0 7 The judge further explained that "[c]onduct is malicious
if it was accompanied by ill will or spite or for thepurpose of injuring another."'08
The judge instructed that "[c]onduct is a reckless disregard of plaintiff's rights if,
under the circumstances, it reflects complete indifference to the safety and rights of
others."'" Thejury awarded compensatory damages of$150,000, punitive damages
of $250,000, and attorney's fees and costs of $100,000 but did not explain what
standard it applied in awarding punitive damages.'" The judge denied the
defendant's motion to vacate the judgment."
The defendant filed for bankruptcy shortly after the trial concluded."' The
plaintiff petitioned the bankruptcy court to except the judgment from discharge
pursuant to § 523(a)(6)." 3 Plaintiff twice moved for summary judgment seeking to
give preclusive effect to the prior judgment."" The bankruptcy court denied her
motions and found that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether or not
the defendant's actions were willful and malicious, because "the jury charge was
too ambiguous to support findings of willfulness and malice by the Debtor.""'
Thus, the bankruptcy court scheduled a trial to determine if the debtor's conduct fell
within § 523(a)(6).
At trial, the plaintiff chose not to testify and instead relied on the record from
the underlying sexual harassment trial." 6 The defendant testified that the plaintiff
was a family friend who was close to his wife, and that she continued to be close to
his family after the alleged sexual harassment occurred."' The defendant denied
sexually harassing the plaintiff and denied forming the intent to injure her."8 The
defendant further testified that the plaintiff was dissatisfied with her compensation
and requested a pay raise before she left her job."9  The defendant's wife
corroborated his testimony.'20
105. Id. at 660-61 (citations to trial transcript omitted).
106. Id. at 661 (alteration in original) (citations to trial transcript omitted).
107. Id. at 662 (alteration in original) (quoting trial transcript).
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. Id.
110. Sanger v. Busch (In re Busch), 311 B.R. 657, 662 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2004).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 663.
116. Sanger v. Busch (In re Busch), 311 B.R. 657, 663 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2004).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 665.
120. Id.
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In analyzing whether or not the defendant's conduct fell within the willful and
malicious injury standard of § 523(a)(6), the court held as a matter of law that
"malice is inherent in finding that the debtor is liable for sexual harassment." '21
Thus, the court's decision to discharge the debt turned on whether the defendant's
conduct met the Geiger test for "willfulness."'22 The bankruptcy court rejected the
plaintiff's contention that a substantial certainty of harm can satisfy the willful
standard from Geiger.23 First, the court held that willfulness was not a necessary
element of the underlying sexual harassment claim, because sexual harassment does
not require that the defendant intend to injure the plaintiff. 24 In addition, the court
held that sexual harassment was not an intentional tort for the purpose of
nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6). 2 ' Finally, the court stated that, "[e]ven if
the acts of sexual harassment occurred exactly as alleged, nothing in the District
Court [aiction or in this proceeding convinces the court that the Debtor intended to
do so.""" The court reasoned that no evidence suggested that the defendant
intended to injure the plaintiff, because "intent to cause... [injury to plaintiff] by
forcing her to resign ... would have been contrary to the Debtor's self-interest so
long as the Plaintiff's relationship with the Debtor's family extended beyond her
employee status."'27 The court concluded that the defendant "'acted with specific
intent to advance his own prurient interests at the expense of [the plaintiff's] right
to be free from sexual attack and harassment,' but nevertheless, that this intent did
not satisfy the Geiger standard for "willfulness. t18
B. Where the Court Went Wrong
The Busch court incorrectly applied the Geiger test for "willful" conduct and
erred in discharging the sexual harassment claim pursuant to § 523(a)(6). First, the
court erred in holding that a substantial certainty of harm cannot satisfy the Geiger
test for "willfulness."' 29 Second, the court confused the defendant's motive to act
with his intent to act. In addition, the court erred by not treating the defendant's
underlying actions as intentional torts to satisfy the "willful" standard. 30 Had the
court properly addressed these three issues, it likely would have reached the proper
conclusion that the debt was not dischargeable.
1. Substantial Certainty of Harm
The Busch court rejected the view that actions substantially certain to cause
harm are "willful" under the Geiger test.' In describing the "willful" prong of §
523(a)(6), the Geiger court, quoting the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 8A, noted
that "[i]ntentional torts generally require that the actor intend 'the consequences of
121. Id. at 668.
122. See Sanger v. Busch (In re Busch), 311 B.R. 657, 669 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2004).
123. Id. at 669-70.
124. Id. at 669.
125. Id. at 670.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Sanger v. Busch (In re Busch), 311 B.R. 657, 670 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2004) (citation
omitted).
129. Id. at 669-70.
130. Id. at 670.
131. Id. at 669.
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an act,' not simply 'the act itself."" 32 The Restatement further states that an act is
intentional when "the actor desires to cause [the] consequences of his act, or... he
believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it."' 33
Most post-Geiger courts have accepted, without question, that the presence of
a substantial certainty of harm can satisfy the "willful" prong of the Geiger test.'34
In many sexual harassment cases, the harassers do not act with specific intent to
injure their victims. 35 However, in many cases, including Busch, the nature of the
predicate acts evidences that the harasser knew or should have known that harm was
substantially certain to result. 36 In Busch, the defendant clearly should have known
that, as a potential consequence of his actions, the plaintiff would leave her job and
suffer emotional distress.
37
2. Motive v. Intent
The Busch court held that, although the defendant "acted with specific intent
to advance his own prurient interests at the expense of [the plaintiff's] right to be
free from sexual attack and harassment," this intent did not satisfy the Geiger
standard for "willfulness.' 13' Advancing his own prurient interests may have
constituted the defendant's motive to act, but was not his intent.
Defining the line between intent and motive in tort law is not easy. Prosser
states:
"Intent" is the word commonly used to describe the desire to bring
about the physical consequences ... ; the more remote objective
which inspires the act is called "motive."....
Intent, however, is broader than a desire to bring about
physical results. It must extend not only to those consequences
which are desired, but also to those which the actor believes are
substantially certain to follow from what he does.... [W]here a
reasonable man in the defendant's position would believe that a
particular result was substantially certain to follow, he will be
dealt with.., as though he had intended it.'39
Otherwise stated, "Whereas motive is the inducement to do some act, intent is the
mental resolution or determination to do it. When the intent to do an act that violates
the law exists, motive becomes immaterial."'" One classic example that
132. Kawaahua v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1997).
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) (emphasis added).
134. See, e.g., Jones v. Svreck (In re Jones), 300 B.R. 133, 140 (B.A.P. Ist Cir. 2003) (holding
that a substantial certainty of harm satisfies the "willful" requirement of § 523(a)(6)).
135. See Gelfand, supra note 13, at 636-37.
136. See, e.g., Jones v. Svreck (In re Jones), 300 B.R. 133, 139-40 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2003)
(explaining that the defendant's interference with the plaintiffs ability to work by making "frequent,
substantial sexual comments about [the plaintiff], concerning her dress and breasts, as well as
inappropriate staring, rubbing, and touching" evidenced specific intent to injure, and further stating that
the defendant should have known that conditioning plaintiffs employment on sex would result in her
losing her job).
137. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (recounting the blatant harassment in which the
defendant engaged).
138. Sanger v. Busch (In re Busch), 311 B.R. 657, 670 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2004) (citation
omitted).
139. WILIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 31-32 (4th ed. 197 1).
140. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 813 (7th ed. 1999).
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distinguishes motive from intent is the man who fires aimlessly into a crowd. The
man may fire the gun for a number of reasons and sincerely hope that he hits no
one, but since he knows that injury is substantially certain to result, his acts are
intentional. 4'
Similarly, even if the defendant in Busch acted only to fulfill his "prurient"
interests, a reasonable man in the defendant's position should have known that
repeatedly sexually assaulting an employee would result in the employee leaving the
job and suffering some distress. Therefore, the Busch court erred in holding that the
defendant's desire for sexual gratification did not establish a specific intent to
injure. Instead, the court should have focused on whether the defendant, or a
reasonable person in the defendant's position, should have known that his actions
would result in harm.
3. Plaintiff's Acts as Intentional Torts
Finally, even if the sexual harassment did not meet the Geiger test, the acts
underlying the plaintiffs claim against the defendant constituted intentional torts
and therefore satisfy the "willful" standard. In Geiger, the court held that "the
(a)(6) formulation triggers in the lawyer's mind the category 'intentional torts,' as
distinguished from negligent or reckless torts." ' Thus, a debt predicated on the
debtor's intentional torts is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6). By repeatedly
trying to kiss the plaintiff, exposing himself, and touching the plaintiff, the
defendant committed at least assault and battery and possibly sexual assault and
sexual battery. The Busch court erred in failing to hold that these intentional torts
made the sexual harassment judgment nondischargeable. 43
VI. CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of South Carolina has not yet heard a
case involving the dischargeability of sexual harassment verdicts. However, as the
number of bankruptcy filings and sexual harassment complaints continues to climb,
the issue is bound to arise. At such time, South Carolina should reject the Busch
court's interpretation of Geiger and side with the majority of courts in holding that
most sexual harassment verdicts are nondischargeable debts. These courts have
struck a critical balance between the goals of sexual harassment and the policies
behind the Bankruptcy Code that the Busch court should not be allowed to upset.
Andy Gaunce
141. See PROSSER, supra note 139, at 31-32.
142. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998).
143. Interestingly, the court in Johnson v. Miera (In re Miera), 104 B.R. 150 (Bankr. D. Miss.
1989), a pre-Geiger case, used this approach to hold a sexual harassmentjudgment nondischargeable.
The court held that the plaintiff, by kissing the defendant without his consent, committed a sexual
battery. Id. at 153. The court held that this intentional tort satisfied the willful prong of § 523(a)(6).
Id. at 154.
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